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Response
Fracking and the Public Trust Doctrine: A Response
to Spence
Alexandra B. Klass
In his article The Political Economy of Local Vetoes,1 Professor David
Spence undertakes a comprehensive and insightful study of state and local
legislation governing the use of hydraulic fracturing (fracking) to produce
shale oil and gas. He focuses particularly on local zoning ordinances
banning or limiting hydraulic fracturing that conflict with state laws
encouraging shale oil and gas development. This focus is appropriate
because, as he notes: “within the last few years more than 400 local
governments, from California to Texas to New York, have enacted
ordinances restricting or banning within their borders the use of hydraulic
fracturing . . . to produce natural gas or oil from shale formations.”2 This is
true despite the fact that state law has historically regulated oil and gas
activities in the United States. 3 As a result, state courts are increasingly
forced to decide state–local preemption issues when drillers and royalty
owners challenge local zoning ordinances that restrict or ban fracking and
when local governments and their citizens challenge state laws that attempt
to override local restrictions or bans on fracking. Spence also discusses the
growing number of regulatory takings claims by producers and landowners
against states and local governments, arguing that such bans on fracking
result in a regulatory “taking” of the private property entitling the owner to

Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. I received helpful comments on
earlier drafts of this response from John Dernbach and John Echeverria.
1. David B. Spence, The Political Economy of Local Vetoes, 93 TEXAS L. REV. 351 (2014).
2. Id. at 351.
3. Mike Soraghan, Protecting Oil from Water—The History of State Regulation, GREENWIRE,
Dec. 14, 2011, http://www.eenews.net/stories/1059957631, archived at http://perma.cc/5V4TYXT4.
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just compensation under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution.
Many of these state–local conflicts are arising for the first time with the
shale gas “boom” because shale gas resources are often located near
population centers and because some of this development is occurring in
states and in parts of states that have not been oil-and-gas producing areas for
nearly a century, if ever.4 Moreover, the concerns over fracking operations
are numerous and cover a broad range of environmental and aesthetic
impacts that are generally within the purview of both state and local law. For
instance, Spence summarizes the potential impacts of fracking operations
local governments are responding to as including groundwater
contamination, surface-water contamination, localized earthquakes,
groundwater depletion, air pollution, excessive truck traffic, noise,
interference with quality of life, and disruption of local ecosystems. While
Spence states that a few of these concerns are not supported by scientific
evidence, the fact remains that many of these concerns are driving local
governments and their residents to challenge state efforts to promote fracking
because they believe that they are in a better position than the states to
balance the benefits and costs of fracking.
In comparing the relative benefits and drawbacks to local or state
primacy, Spence’s focus is necessarily on legislation and whether state or
local governments are best positioned to legislate with regard to shale gas
development. But what about the courts? Is there an independent role for
the courts in shaping the development of intergovernmental authority
conflicts and regulatory takings claims associated with shale gas
development in the United States apart from the statutory interpretation
issues that often predominate these types of lawsuits?
This response focuses on the independent role the courts may play in
resolving fracking disputes between states and local governments and in
regulatory takings claims in states with developed public trust doctrines. In
his article, Spence mentions the public trust doctrine and codification of
public trust principles in state constitutions but tends to minimize their
importance. He discusses the 2013 Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision,
Robinson Township v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,5 in which the court

4. See, e.g., J. DANIEL ARTHUR ET AL., WATER RESOURCES AND USE FOR HYDRAULIC
FRACTURING IN THE MARCELLUS SHALE REGION 1–4 (Sept. 2008), available at http://www.dec.ny.
gov/docs/materials_minerals_pdf/GWPCMarcellus.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/KEL6-8MA7
(describing how the Marcellus Shale Region encompasses several major population centers and is
within states that have never had a need to regulate oil and gas development); NATIONAL CONF. OF

STATE LEGISLATURES, NATURAL GAS DEVELOPMENT AND HYDRAULIC FRACTURING: A
POLICYMAKER’S GUIDE (June 2012), available at http://www.ncsl.org/documents/energy/
frackingguide_060512.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/2AJ4-EDL8 (describing widespread
nature of natural gas development and legislative concerns over development activities in
populated areas).
5. 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013).
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invalidated a state statute that prevented local governments from banning or
limiting shale gas development. 6 The plurality based its decision on the
state’s environmental rights amendment to its constitution.7 According to the
court, that amendment, which codifies common law public trust principles,
serves as a limit on the state legislature’s ability to override local government
efforts to limit development for environmental protection purposes.8
Spence recognizes the importance of the decision in Pennsylvania but
concludes that it is “a bit of an outlier in this field” and that its effects “on
state–local preemption doctrine elsewhere remain to be seen.” 9 This
response explores in more detail the role of the public trust doctrine in
resolving intergovernmental disputes over shale oil and gas development as
well as in regulatory takings claims. It suggests that state constitutional
codifications of the public trust doctrine in some states, coupled with robust
judicial interpretation of the common law public trust doctrine in other states,
have the potential to minimize significantly the ability of states to override
local government resistance to shale oil and gas development. The public
trust doctrine may also play a role in regulatory takings claims involving
shale oil and gas development by providing “cover” to state and local
governments if their limits on development are intended to protect public
trust resources.
Part I of this response provides background on the public trust doctrine
as it exists under state common law, in state constitutions, and in state
statutes that have codified the common law doctrine. Part II discusses the
cases to date that have addressed public trust doctrine issues in the context of
shale oil and gas development. Finally, Part III offers some additional
observations regarding the role of the public trust doctrine in judicial
resolution of state–local disputes and regulatory takings claims associated
with shale oil and gas development.
I.

The Public Trust Doctrine

The public trust doctrine is an ancient Roman doctrine that holds that
there are certain natural resources, notably submerged lands under tidal and
navigable waters, that are subject to government ownership and must be held
in trust for the use and benefit of the public as well as future generations.10
Prior to the 20th century, U.S. courts used the doctrine primarily to preserve
public access to water and shoreland areas for commerce, recreation,
transportation, and fishing purposes. During that time period, the primary

6. Id. (plurality opinion).
7. Id. at 978.
8. See id. at 956–57. A fourth justice concurred in the holding based on substantive due process
grounds. Id. at 1001 (Baer, J., concurring).
9. Spence, supra note 1, at 374–75.
10. See Alexandra B. Klass, Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing Rights and
Integrating Standards, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 702–03 (2006).
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case articulating the scope of the public trust doctrine was Illinois Central
Railroad v. Illinois,11 in which the U.S. Supreme Court held in 1892 that the
public trust doctrine barred the Illinois legislature’s action in 1869 to sell
more than 1,000 acres underlying Lake Michigan in the Chicago Harbor to
the railroad.12 The Court held that the title the state held to the submerged
lands at issue was different in character from other state lands that could be
sold into private ownership.13 Instead, these submerged lands were a “title
held in trust for the people of the State that they may enjoy the navigation of
the waters, carry on commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein
freed from the obstruction or interference of private parties.”14 Although the
state could allow some private economic use of such lands, the uses must be
ones that “do not substantially impair the public interest in the lands and
waters remaining.”15
In the 1970s, the public trust doctrine became important for
environmental protection purposes when professor Joseph Sax wrote an
influential law review article suggesting that the doctrine could act as a
ground to compel states and other governmental entities to protect water and
other natural resources from development and other threats. 16 Since that
time, many states, such as California, Hawaii, New York, and Louisiana,
have developed a robust common law public trust doctrine; other states, such
as Pennsylvania and Montana, enshrined public trust principles in their state
constitutions; and yet others have codified the public trust doctrine in
statutory provisions.17 Thus, in many states throughout the nation, common
law, state constitutions, state statutes, or all three serve to limit state
legislative or executive efforts to sell, impair, or interfere with public trust
resources. In some jurisdictions, notably California, the public trust doctrine
does not require a complete ban on development that would impact public
trust resources. Instead, the doctrine requires government officials to take
public trust resources into account to the extent feasible in making decisions
that would impact such resources.18

11. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
12. Id. at 405 & n.1, 455.
13. Id. at 452.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 556–57 (1970).
17. See Klass, supra note 10, at 723–26 (exploring state statutory schemes incorporating the
doctrine).
18. See, e.g., Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419 (Cal. 1983) (“The state has
an affirmative duty to take the public trust into account in the planning and allocation of water
resources, and to protect public trust uses whenever feasible.”); Holly Doremus, Groundwater and
the Public Trust Doctrine, California Style, LEGAL PLANET (July 21, 2014), http://legalplanet.org/2014/07/21/groundwater-and-the-public-trust-doctrine-california-style/, archived at
http://perma.cc/SDG4-YYFK (asserting that public trust uses need only be protected to the extent
feasible).
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Although many states have limited their common law doctrine to waterbased resources, others such as California and New York have extended the
doctrine to protect wildlife, scenic, and other land-based public trust values.
Moreover, states with constitutional or statutory public trust provisions have
included a broad scope of resources within the doctrine’s protection.19 For
instance, the California courts have found that the common law public
doctrine limits surface water withdrawals that impact lakes; imposes limits
on wind turbines that may kill raptors such as eagles, hawks, and falcons; and
limits groundwater withdrawals that adversely impact connected surface
waters. 20 The California courts have also confirmed that the public trust
doctrine imposes limits on local governmental action as well as state
governmental action.21 In Louisiana, courts have used the doctrine to limit
the construction and operation of a hazardous waste disposal facility.22 In
New York, courts have held for over a century that the public trust doctrine
protects parkland, and there are numerous New York decisions, including
one in 2013, preventing development on parkland based on the doctrine.23
With regard to state constitutional provisions, Pennsylvania amended its
state constitution in 1971 to provide that:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the
preservation of natural, scenic, historic, and esthetic values of the
environment. Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the
common property of all the people, including generations yet to
come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall
conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.24

19. Klass, supra note 10, at 707–14.
20. See Doremus, supra note 18 (reporting on a California trial court decision in July 2014
holding that groundwater pumping that affects flows in a navigable stream are subject to the public
trust doctrine).
21. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. FPL Grp., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588, 599–602 (Cal. Ct. App.
2008) (holding that the public trust doctrine places obligations on counties to consider impacts on
raptors and other birds when approving and regulating wind turbine projects but that the plaintiffs
could not succeed on their claims because they sued the private wind farm operators rather than the
counties that owed the legal duty under the doctrine).
22. Save Ourselves, Inc. v. La. Envtl. Control Comm’n, 452 So. 2d 1152, 1159–60 (La. 1984)
(recognizing that that the public trust doctrine imposes a duty on state actors to provide meaningful
review of the impact of their decisions on natural resources and the environment); Ryan M.
Seidemann, The Public Trust Doctrine and Surface Water Management and Conservation: A View
from Louisiana (Mar. 17–19, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (discussing potential impacts of
public trust doctrine on development of shale resources in Louisiana).
23. See, e.g., Raritan Baykeeper, Inc. v. City of New York, 984 N.Y.S.2d 634 (Sup. Ct. Dec. 20,
2013) (granting plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and holding that development of a
composting facility in a park violates the common law public trust doctrine and citing earlier similar
cases).
24. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
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When Montana amended its constitution in 1974, it included a provision that
granted an “inalienable” right to a “clean and healthful environment” and
placed a duty on the state and private parties to “maintain and improve a
clean and healthful environment in Montana for present and future
generations.” 25 Montana courts have used the Montana constitutional
provision to hold that a nonprofit group could sue the state environmental
agency and a mining company to prevent discharge of contaminants into a
river that would adversely impact water quality and species even though the
agency’s rules allowed the discharge. 26 Thus, constitutional public trust
provisions can override conflicting state statutes and regulatory decisions.
As for statutory public trust provisions, Minnesota, Michigan, and a few
other states enacted environmental rights statutes in the 1970s that codified
the public trust doctrine and expanded its scope to include land, water, soil,
animal, mineral, aesthetic, and other natural resources.27 For instance, the
Minnesota Environmental Rights Act (MERA) gives any person the right to
seek injunctive relief in court against any person “for the protection of the
air, water, land, or other natural resources” in the state whether publicly or
privately owned, from “pollution, impairment or destruction.” 28 “Natural
resources” include, but are not limited to, “all mineral, animal, botanical, air,
water, land, timber, soil, quietude, recreational and historical resources” as
well as state-owned scenic and aesthetic resources.29 Minnesota courts have
interpreted MERA broadly to protect birds, trees, historic buildings, marsh
and wetland areas, quietude in residential areas, drinking water wells,
wetlands, and the wilderness experience in forests. 30 To protect such
resources, Minnesota courts have enjoined a gravel pit operation, a shooting
range, tree harvesting, and highway projects, among others. 31 Like
California, Minnesota law limits local government action as well as state
action that may impact protected natural resources.32
The discussion above shows how the public trust doctrine can serve as a
judicial “sword” to limit actions by private parties, local governments, and
state governments that may adversely impact protected public trust resources.
But the public trust doctrine can also serve as a “shield” for local or state
actors when they attempt to limit private action that may adversely impact

25. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3; MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
26. Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Dept. of Envtl. Quality, 988 P.2d 1236, 1242–43 (Mont. 1999).
27. Klass, supra note 10, at 719–27.
28. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 116B.02–03 (West 2014).
29. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.02 (West 2014).
30. Klass, supra note 10, at 722–23.
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., State ex rel. Archabal v. Cnty. of Hennepin, 495 N.W.2d 416, 421–26 (Minn.
1993) (holding that MERA prevented a city from demolishing historic building to build a new jail);
Cnty. of Freeborn v. Bryson, 210 N.W.2d 290, 297 (Minn. 1973) (holding that MERA prevented a
county from building a highway through a wetland area where feasible and prudent alternatives
were available).
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public trust resources. For instance, courts have rejected regulatory takings
claims against state and local governments on public trust grounds when
governments have amended instream flow regulations, prohibited the filling
of wetlands, restricted urban development, banned personal watercraft on
certain waterbodies, denied a permit for a pier, or otherwise taken actions to
protect public trust resources that impact private property rights.33
Because of the scope of resources subject to public trust protection and
the wide range of surface water, groundwater, land, and aesthetic impacts
associated with shale oil and gas development, it is hardly a stretch to
envision use of the public trust doctrine to override state statutes that
encourage development to the detriment of protected resources or that limit
local governments’ efforts to restrict such development. The next Part
explores the application of the public trust doctrine to shale oil and gas
operations to date.
II. Potential Public Trust Doctrine Limits on Shale Oil and Gas
Development
Many of the states with public trust protection of natural resources as a
result of common law, statute, or state constitution have significant shale oil
or gas resources. These include California, Pennsylvania, Michigan, New
York, Louisiana, and Montana. Although not all of these states have applied
public trust protections to limit shale oil and gas development, several state
legislatures and courts have addressed the issue.
For instance, in Pennsylvania, in 2012, the legislature enacted a new law,
“Act 13,” that required all local ordinances to “allow for the reasonable
development of oil and gas resources” and imposed uniform rules for oil and
gas regulation.34 Local governments and residents that had enacted zoning
ordinances limiting hydraulic fracturing that were more stringent than Act 13
challenged the law on various grounds, including an argument that it violated
Article I, Section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. In a 2013 decision,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court plurality agreed and invalidated many
provisions of Act 13. 35 It held that “a new regulatory regime permitting

33. See Klass, supra note 10, at 734–43 (discussing cases involving regulatory takings claims);
Alexandra B. Klass, Renewable Energy and the Public Trust Doctrine, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1021, 1031 (2012) (same).
34. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3303–3304 (West 2014) (providing that state environmental
laws “occupy the entire field” of oil and gas regulation to the exclusion of all local ordinances, that
state law preempts and supersedes local regulation of oil and gas operations, and that all local
ordinances must allow for the reasonable development of oil and gas resources, and imposing
uniform rules for hydraulic fracturing in the state that prevent local governments from establishing
more stringent rules).
35. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 913 (Pa. 2013) (plurality opinion); see also
John C. Dernbach et al., Robinson Township v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania: Examinations and
Implications (Widener Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 14-10), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2412657, archived at http://perma.cc/F77T-PWGW.
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industrial uses as a matter of right in every type of pre-existing zoning
district is incapable of conserving or maintaining the constitutionallyprotected aspects of the public environment and of a certain quality of life.”36
Moreover, under the law, “some properties and communities will carry much
heavier environmental and habitability burdens than others,” which is
inconsistent with the Commonwealth’s obligation to act as a trustee.37 This
result is inconsistent with the obligation that the trustee act for the benefit of
“all the people.”38
In interpreting its Environmental Right Amendment, the plurality found
that the obligation to preserve protected resources was imposed not only on
the state but on local governmental entities as well. 39 As a result, the
plurality found that by limiting the ability of local governments to protect
public trust resources for their citizens, the state legislature not only failed to
meet its own obligation under the state constitution but also prevented local
governments from meeting their similar obligations under the state
constitution.40
While in Pennsylvania it was the state legislature that acted to promote
hydraulic fracturing by limiting local zoning laws, in Vermont, in 2012, the
state legislature banned hydraulic fracturing throughout the state.41 Notably,
in hearings leading up to the new legislation, supporters cited the public trust
doctrine as a reason to impose the ban. 42 In 2008, the state had enacted
legislation declaring that groundwater was a public trust resource subject to
judicial protection under the common law public trust doctrine.43 In 2012,
legislators expressed concern that if shale gas operations resulted in
groundwater contamination, the state would be violating its public trust
obligations.44
In Louisiana, which has a robust common law public trust doctrine as
well as shale oil and gas resources, the state responded to numerous
criticisms that massive amounts of water were being used for hydraulic
fracturing purposes without considering competing public trust values.45 As
a result, in 2010, the Louisiana attorney general and other state agencies
issued a guidance memorandum stating that based on the public trust

36. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 979 (plurality opinion).
37. Id. at 980.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 977–78.
40. Id.
41. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1390 (2013).
42. Carl Etnier, Vermont First State in Nation to Ban Fracking for Oil and Gas, VTDIGGER.ORG
(May 4, 2012), available at http://vtdigger.org/2012/05/04/vermont-first-state-in-nation-to-banfracking-for-oil-and-gas/, archived at http://perma.cc/6UY-4JPM.
43. 2008 Vt. Acts & Resolves 624–30.
44. See id. (discussing how the ban on fracking could help to protect Vermont’s air, land, and
water).
45. Seidemann, supra note 22, at 2–6.
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doctrine, any use of running waters in the state must be approved by the
state’s attorney general’s office and the state Department of Natural
Resources and that the state had an affirmative duty under the doctrine as
well as the state constitution to ensure that consumptive uses of the state’s
waters were not threatening protected resources.46
The same concerns have been expressed in California, which has a robust
common law public trust doctrine and may also possess significant shale oil
and gas resources. Although fracking is allowed in both on- and off-shore
wells in the state and in federal waters off the coast, many in the state are
concerned about the environmental impacts of fracking on inland and coastal
waters as well as on the natural resources and wildlife those waters support.47
A California court also held in 2014 that the public trust doctrine limits
adverse impacts to groundwater that are connected to surface waters
protected by the doctrine.48 Because California has well-developed case law
on the public trust doctrine and courts have used the doctrine to limit a wide
range of industrial activities and development, any future expansion of
fracking operations will inevitably encounter claims based on the public trust
doctrine. Moreover, any effort by the state in the future to override local
fracking bans will face good arguments that the public trust doctrine prevents
such an override of local authority and requires both state and local
authorities to balance the benefits of fracking with the potential impact on
protected resources.
In Michigan, the courts have limited both the common law public trust
doctrine and the state’s codification of that doctrine in the Michigan
Environmental Policy Act so that they apply only to “navigable waters” and
not to non-navigable surface waters or to groundwater.49 As a result, some
fracking impacts on waters within the state will place an obligation on state
officials to protect those water resources while other types of impacts solely
to groundwater or non-navigable waters will not. Nevertheless, because the
Michigan statute places obligations on state officials and the state legislature
to protect state natural resources, this could limit state legislative and
executive approvals of fracking operations.50

46. Id.; Memorandum from James D. Buddy Caldwell, Attorney Gen., Office of the Attorney
Gen., and Scott A. Angelle, Sec’y, Dep’t of Natural Res., to All State Surface Water Manager (Feb.
5, 2010), available at http://dnr.louisiana.gov/assets/docs/conservation/groundwater/Appendix_F.
pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/V2JF-MCDP.
47. Patrick McGreevy, Groups Pressure Legislature to Back California Fracking Moratorium,
L.A. TIMES, May 22, 2014, http://www.latimes.com/local/political/la-me-pc-groups-increasepressure-for-moratorium-on-fracking-in-calif-20140522-story.html, archived at http://perma.cc/
5ZBP-PLLL.
48. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
49. Mich. Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestlé Waters N.A., Inc., 709 N.W.2d 174, 222
(Mich. Ct. App. 2005).
50. See, e.g., Katharine Hoeksema, Fracking the Mitten and the Public Trust, MICH. ENVTL.
L.J., Fall 2012, at 14, 23–27 (2012).
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As Spence notes, in addition to state–local preemption issues
surrounding fracking, there are a growing number of regulatory takings
claims against state or local governments that have chosen to limit fracking
activities to the potential financial detriment of drillers and landowners.
Plaintiffs’ groups in New York and Colorado have already filed lawsuits
alleging that government restrictions on fracking result in a taking of private
property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.51 In the famous case of Penn Central
Transportation Company v. New York City,52 the U.S. Supreme Court held
that any regulatory taking claim must consider the nature of the
governmental interest at stake, the magnitude of the economic impact on the
property owner, and the degree to which the regulation interferes with the
reasonable, investment-backed expectations of the property owner. In a later
and controversial case, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission,53 the
Court broadened the circumstances under which a regulation could result in a
taking of property—namely, where a regulation would deprive the owner of
“all economic use” of the property. The court found that a taking could
occur under those circumstances unless “background principles” of state
nuisance and property law would have prohibited the development separate
and apart from the challenged regulation. In the absence of such
“background principles” of state property law, state or local regulation on its
own did not necessarily prevent a landowner from developing reasonable,
investment-backed expectations that could result in a taking requiring
compensation.
Significantly, there are strong arguments that the public trust doctrine is a
“background principle” of common law that would allow states and local
governments to limit fracking without constituting a taking. The public trust
doctrine dates back to Roman law, and has been upheld by the U.S. Supreme
Court since the Illinois Central case in 1892. In that case, the Court found
that the Illinois legislature’s decision to invalidate its sale of the Chicago
Harbor to the railroad was not an unconstitutional taking of private property
because the public trust doctrine prohibited the conveyance in the first
place.54 Since the Illinois Central decision, both federal and state courts in
Washington, New York, and Rhode Island have rejected regulatory takings

51. See Spence, supra note 1, at 397–98 & nn.200–01 (discussing lawsuits); Ellen M. Gillmer,
Envrios Revels in N.Y. Victory as Industry Plans Next Steps, ENERGYWIRE (July 1, 2014),
http://www.eenews.net/energywire/2014/07/01/stories/1060002192, archived at http://perma.cc/
UXU3-VP5U (reporting on New York Court of Appeals decision holding that state oil and gas law
does not preempt local bans on fracking activities and discussing related lawsuits by landowners
and drillers that such bans constitute a taking).
52. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
53. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
54. Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 455 (1892).
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claims in part based on the public trust doctrine.55 State courts could easily
find that state or local limits on fracking designed to protect state waters and
other public trust resources do not result in takings because the impacts of
fracking on water resources, aesthetic resources, and other public trust
resources would be prohibited under the public trust doctrine as a matter of
common law or as incorporated into state statutory or constitutional
provisions codifying the doctrine.
In sum, there are several examples of state courts already applying the
public trust doctrine to shale oil and gas development. There are many
others that have a history of using public trust principles as a check on
legislative action (or to defend state action in response to takings claims) as a
matter of common law, state constitutional law, statutory law, or all three.
As noted earlier, in most cases, the public trust doctrine will not act as a
complete ban on shale oil and gas development in any particular
circumstance. Instead, the doctrine will require state and local actors to
fairly consider the impacts of shale oil and gas development on public trust
resources. Pennsylvania is an example where the state supreme court found
the legislature had gone too far in promoting shale oil and gas development
in a way that prevented state or local actors in the future from providing the
necessary balancing of interests. In other states, the legislative action may
not be so extreme. But the fact remains that the public trust doctrine should
be recognized as having the potential to play a significant role in limiting
shale oil and gas development either by placing limits on state legislation to
override local bans or to defend local or state efforts to protect public trust
resources in the face of regulatory takings claims.
III. The Future Role of the Public Trust Doctrine in Conflicts Over Shale Oil
and Gas Development
Parts I and II explained the contours of the public trust doctrine and how
it has been used to limit shale oil and gas development to date. This Part
returns to Professor Spence’s article and questions what role, if any the
public trust doctrine should play in addressing intergovernmental conflicts
over shale oil and gas development. In other words, how should courts use
the public trust doctrine in determining whether to place limits on state
action, local action, or both with regard to shale oil and gas development?

55. Esplanade Props., LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 981–84 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding a
city’s denial of a shoreland permit application was not a taking because “background principles” of
Washington law, including the public trust doctrine, would restrict the development at issue based
on its potential impact on tidelands); W.J.F. Realty Corp. v. State, 672 N.Y.S.2d 1007, 1012 (Sup.
Ct. 1998) (concluding that the public trust doctrine as well as the state constitution supported
constitutionality of a state law restricting development in Long Island); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,
No. WM 88-0297, 2005 WL 1645974 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 5, 2005), on remand from 533 U.S. 606
(2001) (finding that state denial of permit to fill eighteen acres of salt marsh was not a taking
because landowner’s action would constitute a nuisance and was limited by the state public trust
doctrine, which had been incorporated into the state’s constitution).
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As Spence details so well, local governments and state governments
bring different strengths as well as different shortcomings to regulating shale
oil and gas development. He concludes that local governments do not
capture all the local costs and benefits associated with fracking within their
borders while states do capture most of those impacts.56 This might lead one
to conclude that states are therefore in a better position to regulate, and thus,
state law should preempt local regulation.57 But Spence also points out that
the costs and benefits are not distributed evenly throughout the states, and the
costs of fracking will often fall more heavily on local communities, which
supports their ability to regulate. 58 He ultimately concludes that a rule
against preemption may be the best path to encourage bargaining that would
cause state and local governments to resolve differences over fracking on
their own through payments of royalties or other benefits to local landowners
or governments.59
In some cases, local governments will act to promote shale oil and gas
development above and beyond state law and in more cases local
governments will act to prevent development in opposition to state law. In
either situation, however, in many states the public trust doctrine will require
both state and local governments to consider the impact of development on
public trust resources. This requirement acts as a significant check on
legislative discretion and thus provides additional support for local bans that
may conflict with state efforts to promote shale oil and gas development. At
the same time, however, the public trust doctrine also provides support to
states like California and New York, as well as to local governments
throughout the nation, that may want to move more slowly on shale oil and
gas development because of concerns associated with the impact of such
development on protected public trust resources. In other words, not only
can the public trust doctrine play a role in resolving state–local disputes over
shale oil and gas development, it can also help both state and local
governments balance the benefits and costs of such development and place
greater emphasis on protecting public trust resources in the process.
Significantly, the lawsuits to date surrounding shale oil and gas
development, and particularly those involving the public trust doctrine,
highlight the need for state and local governments to obtain as much
information as possible regarding the condition and existence of public trust
resources and the potential impact of development on those resources. Thus,
government and private studies, research, and assessment will be critical in
resolving the inevitable disputes arising from the conflicts between
development and public trust resources. This process is particularly
important not only for litigation purposes but also because it provides a set of
56.
57.
58.
59.

Spence, supra note 1, at 383.
Id.
Id. at 384.
Id. at 393–94.
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opportunities for resolving conflicts or potential conflicts without the need
for litigation. With better information on the impacts of shale oil and gas
development on public trust resources, state and local governments can in
some circumstances work together and find common law ground within a
framework that includes public trust principles.
In sum, it is possible that the public trust doctrine may play a significant
role in resolving state–local conflicts over regulation of shale oil and gas
development. The Robinson Township case is the first significant use of the
doctrine in this context but it will not be the last. As noted above, while the
doctrine is not a presence in all states with shale gas resources, it is a welldeveloped presence in many of them. Legal scholars are already debating the
impact of Robinson Township outside of Pennsylvania,60 but the important
point is that even though Robinson Township is based on a fairly unique
provision of that state’s constitution, the principles in the case can easily
apply in any state that recognizes public trust principles as a matter of
common law, statute, or state constitutional law.

60. See, e.g., Ellen M. Gilmer, Enviros Push “Public Trust” as Trump Card Over Oil and Gas
Influence, ENERGYWIRE, Aug. 15, 2014, http://www.eenews.net/energywire/2014/08/15/stories/
1060004530, archived at http://perma.cc/C3CQ-HN6T (discussing views of legal experts over the
impact of the Robinson Township case on shale gas development outside of Pennsylvania).

